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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

EARL RICH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No. 8671

ERNEST ELDER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELI11INARY STATEMENT
This is a very si1nple case. There are no law issues.
The testimony at the trial was short (160 pages of transcript). On the crucial facts the testimony of plaintiff
and defendant was in sharp conflict. The trial Judge
believed plaintiff and disbelieved defendant .and awarded
judgment to plaintiff on two of his three causes of action.
On plaintiff'.s other cause of action the trial Judge found
plaintiff had not sustained the burden with respect to
his claim for compensation for the use of his truck a.nd
entered a no cause of action.
Plaintiff does not agree with defendant's statement
of the facts.
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We do agree with defendant that the only two questions for review are (1) whether plaintiff \vas employed
by defendant from approximately July 10, 1956 to July
18, 1956 in the gathering of certain cattle; and (2)
whether defendant was obligated to pay plaintiff !1
$500.00 bonus on account of an earlier contract of employment. Defendant's four points, both in his statement
of points and argument, are directed to these two propositions. We _shall meet these two points and issues in
the order stated.
We shall refer to respondent Rich as plaintiff, to
appellant Elder as defendant, and to defendant Sharp
as Sharp.
POINT I.
DID PLAINTIFF BECOME ENTITLED TO A $500.00
BONUS OFFERED BY DEFENDANT IN A LETTER OF
JANUARY 17. 1956?

In the month of January, 1956, plaintiff, who waa
then in the en1ploy of defendant, "~as about to quit his
ranching and co'v punching job "~ith defendant. Defendant thereupon 'vrote a letter to plaintiff (Exhibit P-1):
'"January 17, 1956
Dear Earl,
Taking up "~here "~e left off today, "~hile I
"Tas at the ranch-! think you are well able io
assu1ne con1ple~te charge of the place. I realize
that you might be concerned about how long the
job "Tould last. However if it 'Yorked out like
I think it "Tould the job "Tould be good for quite
a long tilne. In a·n-y event I would be will1~ng to

agree to pay you, in addition to salary-five
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hundred dollars-if and at any time I sold the
property. Also, as livestock prices improve, which
I think is certain-with the politicians getting
busy-we could consider some increase in salary.
Realizing th.a t you could not handle· the place
alone-I would be willing to hire Don-for $100.00
per n1onth-to begin immediately. However, before mentioning this to Don, talk to your Dad and
Mother about it. Also Buster and the other boys
could have a summer job at fair pay, if they
wanted it. If you and I reached such an .agreement, I \vould want to reserve the large bedroon1
behind the kitchen for the permanent use of my
family-the rest of the house would be yours to
use as you pleased. Of course, this is subject to
the fact, that your Dad and Mother would be welcome to remain in the house, as long as they
wish-the longer-the better.
Regarding the old equipment about the place,
I agree to your breaking it up and disposing of
it, however, I think it would be fair to divide whatever you get for it-% to you-lj3 to me.
Let me hear from you.
Yours truly,
Ernest Elder.''
Plaintiff did not answer that letter in writing, but
shortly thereafter did meet with defendant and discussed
the contents of the letter with him and accepted the bonus
proposal. The conversation was .at the ranch and in connection therewith plaintiff testified:
"A.

He [defendant] asked me if his proposition
was satisfactory.
Q. What did you say~
A. I told him I guess it was. Ye·s." (R. 58)
Plaintiff thereupon ( 1) continued in the employ of
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defendant until on or about June 15, 1956 at which time
(2) defendant sold the r.anch. The two conditions set
forth in this offer to pay a bonus were met and plaintiff
became entitled to the $500.00 bonus. The trial court
stated that it had no hesitancy in deciding this issue in
favor of plaintiff. (R. 199)
Now what does defendant say about the bonus in his
brief~ Under point III .at page 13 of his brief defendant
says the "only evidence concerning a bonus which wa~
presented by plaintiff was the letter of January 17, 1956n
(Exhibit P-1) and he says further that at no time did
plaintiff "eve-r indicate that he would accept the term~
and conditions of the letter." Either counsel for defendant f.ailed to read the record or failed to understand it
as the quotation from the record page 58 hereinabove
set forth fully demonstrates. Plaintiff did accept the
terms and conditions of the bonus offer of January 17,
1956.
Defendant urges, however, that there were two further unwritten conditions attaching to the bonus offer:
(1) Defendant says he or.ally told plaintiff that the
bonus would be paid only if plaintiff "~as not hired by
the person to whom defendant nright sell the ranch. This
condition was not in1posed b3r tern1s of the letter of
.January 17, 1956. After hearing the testimony the trial
court found that this condition 'vas not imposed by defendant (Findings of Fact, Third Cause of Action).
(2) Defendant says there was also the condition
that plaintiff n1ust render faithful, loyal and expert
HPrvices in or.der to beco1ne entitled to the bonus. (Brief,
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page 5) These specific conditions were not imposed by
the letter of January 17, 1956. The court also found that
they were not specifically imposed. (Findings of Fact,
Third Cause of Action) We have no particular quarrel
with the c.ases cited by defendant or with the· law that
there is an implied condition that an employee should
render his services with reasonable diligence and efficiency. But, there is no evidence whatsoever that plaintiff failed to render reasonably good services to defendant. Plaintiff kept records of the cattle (R. 122, 123),
reported weekly to defendant (R. 124), and defendant
admits he was so informed (R. 152) and that plaintiff
rendered valuable services for him.
Defendant apparently fails to realize the dilemma
in which he finds himself: He contends on the one hand
that plaintiff is not entitled to the bonus because of lack
of performance of good services from January 17, 1956
to June 15, 1956. But, on the other hand during said
period of time defendant paid to plaintiff, plaintiff's
regular monthly wage without any complaint or intimation of lack of performance of reasonably good services.
The same services which earned for plaintiff his regular
monthly wage during this period entitled him to the
bonus.
Defendant complain.s that after plaintiff ceased to
work for him and after defendant and Sharp came into
conflict that plaintiff was disloyal in failing to sign a
certain affidavit to be dictated by Mr. King which plaintiff interpreted to be· a sort of guar,antee or assurance
with respect to the number of cattle on the open range
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the spring of 1956. (R. 137-141) Defendant offered
plaintiff $200.00 if he would sign this document. Plaintiff
refused. Neither plaintiff nor any other p·erson could
honestly sign any such document. Inasmuch as th•:
cattle were not gathered and counted in the spring of
1956 that data was unavailable. Plaintiff did, however~
orally give his opinion as to the number of cattle that
might or could have been on the open range in the spring
of 1956 (R. 136) and did inform defendant's attorney
that if an affidavit were prepared and sent to plaintiff~
plaintiff would have his own attorney go over the same
and if it were acceptable that the same would be signed.
(R. 142-143) Defendant's attorney never did prepare
or submit such an affidavit.
This so called "lack of loyalty,'' ex post facto, could
have no bearing on the issue of plaintiffs right to the
bonus. That right either n1aterialized or failed on June
15, 1956 and the decision of plaintiff not to become embroiled in the cattle dispute bet,Yeen defendant and Sharp
can have no bearing on his right to the bonus. Moreover,
it would appear quite unlil{ely that defendant would
stress loyalty as a condition of defendant's en1ployment
in Jan nary of 1956 at 'vhich tune there \Yas no contract or
eonflirt bet,veen defendant and. Sharp. Obvious!~~ this
~tress upon loyalty a.s a condition precedent to plaintifT's right to the bonus is son1ething \Yhich oecurred to
defendant after he and Sharp cru11e to blo\YS. See the
testiinon~'" of defendant in this connection. (R. 178 et seq.)
On or about July 26, 1956 plaintiff "Torked two or
three days for Sharp in the gathering and re1noval of
ecrtain cattle. Plaintiff was not then employed by deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendant and had no obligation, moral or otherwise, to
t~e cattle. Defendant makes the wild and unsupported
....._iscuss with--defendant the gathering ,and- removal ol)
statement that plaintiff "concealed" from defendant the
fact that Sharp removed these cattle from the range
on or about July 26, 1956. (Observe that this date is after
the cattle were turned over to Sharp and was after plaintiff ceased to work for defendant.) But, the record does
not support this statement and on the contrary plaintiff in answer to a question put by defendant's counsel
replied: (R. 135)

_________

-

---

~-

"Q. l\fr. Rich, did you tell me at that time that
you had participated in the removal of two
loads of cattle from the range~
_._~.

I did not. You didn't ask me.

Q. I asked you something else though didn't I~ I
asked you how many cattle there were in the
spring of 1956 didn't I~
A.

And I didn't know.

Q. You said you didn't
A.

know~

That's right.

Q. But you gave us an estimate at that time
didn't you, Mr. Rich~
A.

I did."

Defendant devotes considerable space to the argument that when defendant paid plaintiff shortly after
June 15, 1956 for his regular salary that plaintiff did not
ask for the bonus and that he was paid in full for services
rendered up until that time. Plaintiff was informed even
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after the sale was effected that no sale had \been made
and it is, ther.efore, understandable why he did not then
ask for the bonus.
Defendant deliberately and falsely lead plaintiff to
believe that although he had sold the cattle that he was
retaining the ranch and that he and Sharp were merely
combining their operations and therefore plaintiff was
not entitled to the bonus because the ranch had not been
sold:
"A.

[By Plaintiff] I don't know who told me, but
I thought that Mr. Sharp was out there to
take over the management of the ranch. I
~sked Mr. Elder something to that effect and~
if he was, and he said no. That it wasn't like
that. Told me that Mr. Sharp had a feed
lot in Delta and that he "~as trying to swing
a deal with him to more or less combine the
ranches and the feed lot ; to better advantage
I guess." ( R. 60)
It is apparent that defendant believed that if he
could mis-inform plaintiff concernin~ the status of the
ranch sale that defendant Inight in some n1a1mer avoid
paying the pro1nised bonus. Even as late as August of
1956 when plaintiff called at the ho1ne of defendant in
Salt Lake City plaintiff again asked defendant whether
he w.as "clear out of it, of the ranch~, to "rhich defendant
said "no, that he still had his interest there." (R. 61)
Defendant himself volunteered that perhaps plaintiff
didn't understand that the ranch had been sold. (R. 182)
Pla.i ntiff again asked about the bonus during the conferPneP \Vith defendant at the la"~ office of )fr. King. (R.

188)
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The testimony of plaintiff is confirmed by the testinlony of Sharp : (R. 97)

"A. Well the first Mr. Elder told me that he, that
Mr. Rich had been concerned about his job if
he .sold the place and that he'd agreed to take
care of him. Asked if it was all right if he
[defendant] told him [plaintiff] th.at I had
my feed yard in Delta and we figured the
two operations to go together would be a
benefit to both of us, but I was going to be
in full charge of the whole affair. I would
manage both places and were just putting a
feed yard and r.anch together, that I'd bought
the cattle.

Q. Well that wasn't the fact was
A. No.

it~

Q. And he asked you if it was all right if he
could tell Mr. Rich that~
A.

Yes."

Defendant asserts that plaintiff "never. made any
clai1n for the bonus prior to the time of the filing of th~
complaint" (Brief, page 14). The record discloses that
plaintiff did inquire concerning the sale and the bonus
on more than one occasion prior to the time of the filing
of the complaint and on each instance he was deliberately mis-informed by defendant to the effect that no sale
had been made and that defendant and Sharp were mere~
ly combining their operations. It was in light of this
background of wilful! mis-information given by defendant that plaintiff accepted his pay on or about June 15,
1956 without at that time receiving the bonus settlem.ent.
On the entire case it is not difficult to understand
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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why the trial Judge believed plaintiff and Sharp as
against defendant Elder in light of defendant's deliberate
mis-statements as well as in light of his contradictory
statements. (See the cross-examination of defendant, (R.
176-189)
POINT II.
WAS PLAINTIFF EMPLOYED BY DEFENDANT FROl\1
APPRO·XIMATELY JULY 10, 1956 TO JULY 18, 1956 IN
THE GATHERING OF CERTAIN CATTLE?

Defendant in his brief asserts (1) that plaintiff
failed to show a contract of employment between plaintiff
and defendant for the gathering of the cattle, and (2)
that there was no consider:ation to the defendant for th8
promise to pay the cost of the gathering. (Brief, page 6)
Defendant then quotes certain portions of the record and
says that the evidence in support of plaintiff's position
"comes only fron1 the mouths of plaintiff and Sharp.'·
(Brief, page 7) ,,...e adn1it that there is a conflict between
plaintiff :and Sharp on the one hand and defendant on the
other. The trial Judge, ho,veYer, believed the for1ner
and disbelieved the latter.
(1)

Both plaintiff and Sharp categorically state that
defendant told plaintiff that defendant \VOUld pay the
cost of gathering the cattle.
Plaintiff teBtified: (R.
''(~.

A.

6~)

All right, "That else was said'?
·As I re1ne1nber it, 1\fr. Sharp con1e in then
and he said "Then they go to the 1nountain to
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gather the cows they ar.e working for you
[defendant] then. Mr. Elder said yes." .
Plaintiff on cross-examination testified concerning
a telephone conversation placed between him and defendant on or about July 4, 1956: (R. 66)
''Q. Well this call that you made novv, Mr. Rich,
you were in doubt as to whether or not you
had any authority to hire anybody on behalf
of Mr. Elder or authority to charge any
groceries to his account or act in any way on
his behalf didn't you~
A.

I was not.

Q. You just, well then why were you calling him
from Wellington to Salt L:ake City if you had
no doubt about your authority~
A.

Q.

To get him to confirm my authority to do it.
Once more.
Once more, is that right~

A. Yes."
As counsel for plaintiff admits, the testimony of
plaintiff on this point is confirmed by the testimony of
Sharp. Concerning the conversation at the ranch a few
days following June 15, 1956, Sharp testified as follows:
(R. 95)
"A. A few days after the 15th he [defendant] told
Mr. Rich tha.t I was in charge and would pay
them from June, 15th on. And we had to get
the hay up, and as soon as the hay was finished that he was going back to work for him
to gather the cattle.

Q. Now that's what he told Mr.
A.

Rich~

Yes. Then they went ahead with some other
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business, and as we left I repeated again to
Mr. Rich, well you're all working for me.
it~

Q.

Was Mr. Elder there when you repeated

A.

Yes.

Q.

What did you

A.

I said, 'Fellows you're working for me during the hay and you go back to work for lvfr.
Elder on the, when the cattle count starts.'

say~

say~

Q. What did Elder
A.

O.K. Said yes."

The trial Judge believed the testimony of plaintiff
and Sharp. The evidence is substantial and is contradicted only by defendant himself.
(2)

There is absolutely no merit to the contention of
defendant that there "~as no consideration to hin1 for his
promise to pay for the gathering of the cattle. If I
understand defendant's .argmnent it is that his contract
'vith Sharp did not require hin1 to gather the cattle and
therefore even though he did ask the plaintiff to gather
these cattle and even though he did agree to pay for the
gathering that there 'vas no consideration for the promise
to pay. To 1uerely state this argu1nent is to den1onstrate
its fallacy. \'1hether defendant "~as obliged under his
eontract 'vith Sharp to gathPr the cattle on the range is
,vholly inunaterial in so far as his obligation to pay plaint i.ff for the gathering is concerned. The record clearly
nstablishes and the court found that defendant requested
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plaintiff to gather the cattle, that he agreed to pay him
for the services rendered .and that plaintiff did gather the
cattle. Most certainly it is no defense to an action on
that promise to pay for defendant to now say that as
bet\veen defendant and Sharp he had no obligation to
gather the cattle.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

THERALDN. JENSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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